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Abstract
We consider a simple pure exchange economy with two assets, one riskless, yielding
a constant return, and one risky, paying a stochastic dividend, and we assume trading
to take place in discrete time inside an endogenous price formation setting. Traders
demand for the risky asset is expressed as a fraction of their individual wealth and is
based on future prices forecast obtained on the basis of past market history.
The general case is studied in which an arbitrary large number of heterogeneous
traders operates in the market and any smooth function which maps the innite infor-
mation set to the present investment choice is allowed as agent's trading behavior. A
complete characterization of equilibria is given and their stability conditions are derived.
We nd that this economy can only possess isolated generic equilibria where a single
agent dominates the market and continuous manifolds of non-generic equilibria where
many agents hold nite wealth shares. We show that irrespectively of agents number
and of their behavior, all possible equilibria belong to a one dimensional \Equilibria
Market Line". Finally we discuss the relative performances of dierent strategies and
the selection principle governing market dynamics.
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11 Introduction
This work analyzes a simple asset pricing model where an arbitrary number of heterogeneous
traders participate in a speculative activity. We consider a simple, pure exchange, two-asset
economy. The rst asset is a riskless security, yielding a constant return on investment. This
security is chosen as the num eraire of the economy. The second asset is a risky equity, paying a
stochastic dividend. Trading takes place in discrete time and in each trading period the price
of the risky asset is xed by imposing market clearing condition on the aggregate demand
function. Agents participation to the market is described in terms of their individual demand
for the risky asset.
We impose two restrictions on the way in which the individual demand of traders is formed.
First, we assume that the amount of risky security demanded by a trader is proportional to
his wealth. This assumption is consistent with, but not limited to, the maximization of
an expected utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Second, since the
present work is mainly concerned with the eect of speculative behaviors and not of asymmetric
evaluation and/or knowledge of the underlying fundamental of the economy, we assume that
all traders, when making their investment choices, possess the same public information set.
This set is naturally dened to contain the past price returns and the complete characterization
of the dividend stochastic process.
While the CRRA framework seems to better t empirical and experimental evidence (see,
for instance the discussions in Levy et al. (2000) and Campbell and Viceira (2002)) and
has characterized many among the most important contributions to the theory of economic
behavior in speculative environment, it has been partly disregarded in the \agent based"
literature. In this eld the majority of early contributions consider models where agents
investment choices are independent from their wealth (for a review see LeBaron (2000) and
Hommes (2005)). In terms of expected utility theory, this amounts to consider constant
absolute risk averse (CARA) traders. In fact, the assumption of a CRRA-type behavior
does introduce noticeable practical diculties: if prices are endogenously determined by the
investment decisions of a population of CRRA traders, the analysis of the resulting market
dynamics requires to account, along the evolution of the economy, for the present wealth of each
individual portfolio. Hence, when many dierent traders operate in the market, this results
in a system of substantially higher dimension and leads to a seeming increase in complexity.
Notwithstanding these diculties, a series of recent papers (Chiarella and He, 2001, 2002;
Hens and Schenk-Hopp e, 2005; Amir et al., 2005) started to analytically explore the asymptotic
dynamics of CRRA agent based models while another group of contributions (Levy et al.,
1994, 2000; Zschischang and Lux, 2001) performed a numerical investigation of the emerging
properties. In these models the individual demand of traders is usually obtained through the
maximization of a CRRA expected utility1 based on dierent estimators in order to re
ect
dierent stylized speculative behaviors, like \fundamental", \trend chaser" or \contrarian"
attitude. However, the requirement of keeping the dimension of the resulting dynamical system
low forces the authors to limit both the set of allowed forecasting functions and the number
of strategies present in the market at the same time.
In the present paper, we extend these early investigations in two directions. First, we
analyze the aggregate dynamics and asymptotic behavior of the market when an arbitrary
large number of dierent traders, each with his own investment behavior, participate to the
1 They frequently use logarithmic utility function, but the generalization of their analyses and conclusions
to generic risk averse power utility is, often, trivial.
2trading activity. Second, we do not restrict in any way the procedure used by agents in order
to build their forecast about future prices, nor the way in which agents can use this forecast
to obtain their present asset demand. In other terms, any smooth function which maps the
agent information set to the present investment choice is allowed as agent's trading behavior.
Even if considering an arbitrary number of dierent agents behaviors leads us to study
dynamical systems of an arbitrary large dimension, we are able to provide a complete charac-
terization of market equilibria and a description of their stability conditions in terms of few
parameters characterizing the traders investment strategies. In particular, we nd that, irre-
spectively of the number of agents operating in the market and of the structure of their demand
functions, only two types of equilibria are possible: generic equilibria, associated with isolated
xed points, where a single agent asymptotically possesses the entire wealth of the economy
and non generic equilibria, associated with continuous manifolds of xed points, where many
agents possess a nite shares of the total wealth. We also show, in total generality, that a sim-
ple function, the \Equilibria Market Line", can be used to obtain a geometric characterization
of both the location of all possible equilibria and the conditions of their stability.
Our general results provide, we believe, a simple and clear description of the principles
governing the asymptotic market dynamics resulting from the competition of dierent trad-
ing strategies. As a direct consequence we are able to discuss the validity and limits of the
\quasi-optimal selection principle", originally formulated in Chiarella and He (2001) for linear
demand functions, when more general traders behaviors are taken into consideration. At the
same time, we show how the possible existence of multiple, isolated, locally stable equilibria
and the ensuing local nature of traders relative performances can be interpreted as an \impos-
sibility theorem" for the construction of a dominance order relation inside the space of trading
strategies.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our simple pure-
exchange economy, presenting our assumptions and brie
y discussing them. We explicitly
write the traders inter-temporal budget constraints and lay down the equations governing
the dynamics of the market. In Section 3 we present the simple case in which a single trader
operates in the market. The Equilibria Market Line is derived, and its use is shortly discussed.
The general case in which an arbitrarily large number of traders participates the trading
activity is analyzed in Section 4. Our conclusions, and the directions our work will plausibly
take in the future, are brie
y mentioned in Section 5.
2 Denition of the Model
Consider a simple pure exchange economy, populated by a xed number N of traders, where
trading activities take place in discrete time. The economy is composed by a risk-less asset
(bond) giving in each period a constant interest rate rf > 0 and a risky asset (equity) paying
a random dividend Dt at the end of each period t. Let the risk-less asset be the num eraire
of the economy, so that its price is xed to 1. The price Pt of the risky asset is determined
at each period, on the basis of the aggregate demand, through market-clearing condition.
The resulting intertemporal budget constraint is derived below and the main hypotheses, on
the nature of the investment choices and of the fundamental process, are discussed. These
hypotheses will allow us to derive the explicit dynamical system governing the evolution of
the economy.
32.1 Intertemporal Budget Constraint
Let Wt;n be the wealth of trader n at time t and let xt;n stands for the fraction of this
wealth invested into the risky asset. After the trading session at time t 1, agent n possesses
xt 1;n Wt 1;n=Pt 1 shares of risky asset and (1   xt 1;n)Wt 1;n shares of risk-less security. At
this moment he receives the payment of risk-less interest rf on the wealth invested in the latter
and dividends payment Dt 1 per each risky asset. Therefore, at time t the wealth of agent n,
for any notional price P, reads
Wt;n(P) = (1   xt 1;n)Wt 1;n (1 + rf) +
xt 1;n Wt 1;n
Pt 1
(P + Dt 1) (2.1)
and his individual demand for the risky asset becomes xt;n Wt;n(P)=P. The actual price of the
risky asset at time t is xed so that aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. Assuming a
constant supply of risky asset, whose quantity can then be normalized to 1, the price Pt is
dened as the solution of the equation
N X
n=1
xt;n Wt;n(Pt) = Pt : (2.2)
Once the price is xed, the new portfolios and wealths are determined and, at the end of
period t, the dividend Dt and the risk-free interest rf are paid. At this point the trading
session at time t + 1 can start.
The dynamics dened by (2.1) and (2.2) describes an exogenously growing economy due
to the continuous injections of new riskless assets, whose price remains, under the assumption
of totally elastic supply, unchanged. It is convenient to remove this exogenous economic
expansion from the dynamics of the model. To this purpose we introduce rescaled variables
wt;n = Wt;n=(1 + rf)
t ; pt = Pt=(1 + rf)
t ; et = Dt=(Pt (1 + rf)) : (2.3)
Rewriting (2.2) and (2.1) using these variables one obtains
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8n 2 f1;:::;Ng :
(2.4)
These equations give the evolution of state variables wt;n and pt over time, provided that
the stochastic process fetg is given and the set of investment shares fxt;ng is specied. Such
dynamics implies a simultaneous determination of the equilibrium price pt and of the agents'
wealths wt;n. Due to this simultaneity, the N + 1 equations in (2.4) dene the state of the
system at time t only implicitly. Indeed, the N variables wt;n, dened in the second equation,
appear on the right-hand side of the rst, and, at the same time, the variable pt, dened in
the rst equation, appears in the right-hand side of the second. For analytical purposes, one
has to derive the explicit equations that govern the system dynamics.
2.2 Dynamical System for Wealth and Return
The transformation of the implicit dynamics of (2.4) into an explicit one is not possible in
general. Indeed the simultaneous determination of price and wealth in (2.4) entails some
4restriction on the possible market positions available to agents2. We derive this restriction
below, but before let us introduce a notation that will prove useful to present the dynamics
in a more compact form.






















The next result gives the condition for which the dynamical system implicitly dened in
(2.4) can be made explicit without violating the requirement of positiveness of prices
Proposition 2.1. From equations (2.4) it is possible to derive a map R+N ! R+N that
describes the evolution of traders wealth wt;n 8n 2 f1;:::;Ng so that prices pt 2 R+ 8t
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t
8n 2 1;:::;N : (2.8)
Proof. See appendix A.
The explicit price dynamics can be obtained from (2.7) in a trivial way but price will be
positive only if condition (2.6) is satised3.
Having obtained the explicit dynamics for the evolution of price and wealth one is interested
in the asymptotic behavior of the system. In turns out that the dynamics dened by (2.7)
and (2.8) does not possess any interesting xed point. Indeed, if the price and the wealth are
constant, one would have rt+1 = t+1;n = 0 for any t and n. This would imply, in periods when
a positive dividend et is paid, that xt;n = 0 for any n. That is, the only possible xed point,
in terms of price and wealth levels, is the one in which there is no demand for the risky asset.
The cause is that the variables rescaling introduced in (2.3) removes the exogenous expansion
due to the risk-free interest rate, but not the expansion due to the dividend payment. The
2The simplest way to understand this is to consider the case of a single agent. With a little bit of algebra it
is easy to show that (2.1) and (2.2) imply that at time t the price should satisfy the equation Pt = xt (Pt+Bt),
where Bt denotes the amount of the num eraire available to the agent before trading. Therefore, a positive
price requires xt < 1. In the dynamical setting with many agents the matter is more complicated, since both
current and previous investment choices of all agents are involved in the determination of price.
3In general, it may be quite dicult to check the validity of this condition at each time step. A sucient
condition is provided in Anufriev et al. (2004) where it is shown that if investment choices xt;n are bounded
inside the interval (0;1), uniformly with respect to t and n, condition (2.6) is always satised.
5presence of this expansion suggests to look for possible asymptotic states of steady growth.
Notice, however, that if the dividend yield et depends on price, it is impossible to rewrite the
dynamics in Proposition 2.1 in terms of the sole price and wealth returns. This issue is solved
as soon as one makes the following
Assumption 1. The dividend yields et are i.i.d. random variables obtained from a common
distribution with positive support.
This assumption is common to several works in the literature, for instance Chiarella and He
(2001), so that a further reason to have this assumption introduced is to maintain comparabil-
ity with previous investigations. Under Assumption 1, direct dependence on price disappears
from (2.7) and (2.8). Consequently, the dynamics of the economy is fully specied in terms of
rt and t;n for n 2 f1;:::;Ng.
2.3 Agents Investment Functions
In the present work we are mainly concerned with the eect of speculative behaviors on the
market aggregate performance. In order to eliminate eects due to asymmetric evaluation
and/or knowledge of the underlying fundamental process we model the agents' investment
choice as depending on the sole realized price returns, assuming, for any agent, a perfect
knowledge of the dividend process. Consequently, the information set I commonly available
to traders at round t reduces to the sequence of past realized returns It 1 = frt 1;rt 2;:::g
and we make the following
Assumption 2. For each agent n there exists a dierentiable investment function fn which
maps the present information set into his investment share:
xt;n = fn(It 1) : (2.9)
The function fn in the right-hand side of (2.9) gives a complete description of the in-
vestment decision of the n-th agent. The knowledge about the fundamental process, being
complete and time invariant, is not explicitly inserted in the information set, rather is con-
sidered embedded in the functional form of fn. Past realizations of the fundamental process
do not aect agents' decisions, which, rather, tends to adapt to observed price 
uctuations.
One can refer to this investment behavior, common in agent based literature (e.g. Brock and
Hommes (1998)), as \technical trading", stressing the similarity with trading practices ob-
served in real markets. At the same time, Assumption 2 rules out other possible dependences
in the investment function fn, like an explicit relation of the present investment choice with
past investment choices or with investment choices of other traders.
In the majority of models discussed in the literature the investment choice described by
(2.9) is obtained as the result of two distinct steps. In the rst step agent n, using a set of
estimators fgn;1;gn;2;:::g, forms his expectation at time t about the behavior of future prices,
n;j[rt+1] = gn;j(It 1) where :;j stands for some statistics of the returns distribution at time
t + 1, for instance the average return, the variance or the probability that a given return
threshold be crossed. With these expectations, using a choice function hn, possibly derived
from some optimization procedure4, he computes the fraction of the wealth invested in the
4The assumption that the demand function of any agent at time t can be written as xt;n Wt;n=Pt, with xt;n
independent from his present wealth Wt;n and price level Pt, is consistent with a framework in which agents
investment decisions are obtained via expected utility maximization with a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function. Assumption 2 is clearly violated, however, if agents are assumed constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) expected utility maximizers.
6risky asset xt+1;n = hn(1;2;:::). The investment function fn dened in Assumption 2 is the
result of the composition of estimators fgn;g and choice function hn. This interpretation is
both intuitive and common in the economic literature, but, even if perfectly compatible with
(2.9), it is not required by our framework. In our model agents are not forced to use some
specic predictors, rather they are allowed to map the past return history into the future
investment choice, with whatever smooth function they like. Moreover, function fn, as it is
written in (2.9), can be innite dimensional. In this case, a complete dynamical system for
the return dynamics should be, generally speaking, innite-dimensional as well. This diculty
can be overcome in dierent ways. For instance, in Anufriev et al. (2004), while leaving the
choice function h generic, we conned agents to use, as forecasts functions fgn;1;gn;2;:::g,
exclusively the expected return En[rt+1] and variance Vn[rt+1] obtained from exponentially
weighted moving average (EWMA) estimates based on past realized returns. In that case the
dynamics can be described with the use of a low dimensional system, even if the information
set remains innite. In fact, this dimensional reduction is always possible provided that the
agents forecasting procedure admits a recursive denition.
In what follows, however, we want to consider a more generic situation. We assume that
each agent n has his own, so to speak, "memory time span" Ln, so that at each time step his
new investment choice is determined as a function of the last Ln return realizations. Apart
the requirement that it possesses rst order derivatives with respect to the past price returns,
we do not restrict this function in any way. Moreover, for the following discussion, Ln must
be nite, but can be arbitrary large.
3 Single Agent Case
We start with the analysis of the very special situation in which a single agent operates on
the market. The main reason to perform this analysis rests in its relevance for the multi-agent
case. Indeed, in the setting with N heterogeneous traders each generic multi-agent equilibrium
requires, as necessary condition for stability, the stability of a suitably dened single agent
equilibrium5.
This Section starts laying down the dynamics of the single agent economy as a multidi-
mensional dynamical system of dierence equations of the rst order. All possible equilibria
of the system are identied and the associated characteristic polynomial, which can be used
to analyze their stability, derived.
3.1 Dynamical System
In the case of one single agent the dynamical system describing the market evolution can be
considerably simplied since the explicit evolution of wealth shares in (2.8) is not needed. As
a consequence, the whole system can be described with only L + 1 variables: one variable
represents the current investment choice xt and the other variables the L past returns.
The current return can be dened by means of the function in the right hand-side of (2.7):
R(x
0;x;e) =
x0   x + ex0 x
(1   x0)x
; (3.1)
5Another possible application of the single agent analysis is to provide a succinct description of the aggregate
properties of a system with many relatively homogeneous agents. See Anufriev et al. (2004) for a discussion.
7where the rst variable x0 denotes the current (contemporaneous with return) investment
choice, and x and e stands for the previous period investment choice and dividend yield,
respectively.
With such denitions the dynamical system governing the evolution of the economy with
a single agent reads
8
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where rt;l stands for the price return at time t   l.
In the rest of this Section we are interested in analyzing the so-called deterministic skeleton
of this L + 1-dimensional system. That is, we substitute the yield by its mean value  e in
order to obtain the deterministic dynamical system which gives, in a sense, the "average"
representation of the stochastic dynamics.
3.2 Determination of Equilibria
In the following analysis, in order to give a simple geometrical characterization of equilibria
of system (3.2) we will use the following
Denition 3.1. The Equilibria Market Line (EML) is the function l(r) dened according to
l(r) =
r
 e + r
r 2 [ 1;1): (3.3)
Let x denotes the agent's wealth share invested in the risky asset at equilibrium and let
r be the the equilibrium return. In any xed point the realized returns are constant, so that
r0 = r1 =  = rL 1 = r. One has the following
Proposition 3.1. Let x = (x;r;:::;r) be a xed point of system (3.2).
(i) The point x is a feasible equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium prices are positive, if either
x < 1 or x  1=(1    e).




 e + r = x
 (3.4)









 +  e) = r
 (3.6)



























Figure 1: Investment functions (thick lines) based on the last realized return. The equilibria are
found as intersections with the EML (thin line). Both functions have two equilibria: S1 and U1 the
non-linear, S2 and U2 the linear.
Proof. Item (i) follows directly from condition (2.6) written at equilibrium. In order to get
(3.5) one has to plug the equilibrium values of the variables in the rst equation in (3.2). From




;  e) =  e
x
1   x :
Inverting this relation to obtain x as a function of r and using (3.5) one gets (3.4). Finally,
from (2.8) using the previous relations one has  = x(r +  e) = l(r)(r +  e) = r.
The rst item states that economically meaningful equilibria are characterized by values
of the investment share inside the intervals ( 1;1) or [1=(1    e);+1). This is equivalent to
the restriction r   1. The second item justies the introduction of the Equilibria Market
Line in Denition 3.1: all equilibria of system (3.2) can be found as the intersections of the
EML with the full symmetrization of function f, i.e. with the restriction of this function to
the one dimensional subspace dened by the L   1 equations r0 = r1 =  = rL. Notice that
for r =   e no bounded equilibria exist. This is a general property of the system with N
agents dened in (2.7) and (2.8). If at equilibrium the positive dividend yield were oset by a
negative price return, the wealth of each agent would be constant over time and the investment
share would increase with a rate 1    e. Finally, the third item states that the growth rate of
the agent's wealth coincides with the price growth rate. It is interesting that the interrelation
between the total return r +  e and the investment in equilibrium x is such that the total
wealth grows with a rate which does not directly dependent on the dividend yield.
As a rst example of the application of Proposition 3.1 consider investment functions which
are one-dimensional functions of the sole last return (i.e. L = 1). In Fig. 1 two functions of
this type are shown (thick lines) together with the hyperbolic curve representing the EML
9dened in (3.3) (thin line). The intersections of the investment function with the EML are the
possible equilibria of the system. The ordinate of the intersection gives the value of equilibrium
investment share x, while the abscissa gives the equilibrium return r. One can distinguish
between three qualitatively dierent scenarios. In equilibria with r 2 [ 1;  e) the investment
in the risky asset is characterized by negative return r +  e < 0. In these equilibria the agent
maintains a long position in the risky asset (x > 1) so that his wealth return  is negative.
If r 2 (  e;0) the capital gain on the risky asset is negative, nevertheless the gross return
r +  e is positive due to the dividend yield. In these equilibria the agent maintains a short
position in the risky asset (x < 0) and therefore it is again  < 0. Equilibrium S2 for the
linear investment function in Fig. 1 is of such kind. Finally, if r 2 (0;+1) the price return is
positive, the agent position is characterized by a xed fraction of wealth invested in the risky
asset x 2 (0;1) and his wealth return is positive. This is the case of equilibrium U2 of the
linear investment function and equilibria S1 and U1 of the nonlinear function6.
A second "geometrical" example is presented in Fig. 2. The two-dimensional surface rep-
resents the investment function f(r0;r1) = jr0j(r0 + 0:4(r0   r1)) which depends on the two
last realized returns (i.e. L = 2). Here r0 stands for the last period return while r1 is the
return of the period before the last. The thick line on the function surface is the intersection
of the investment function with the \symmetric" plane dened by the condition r0 = r1. On
the same plane the curve relative to EML l(r) is also drawn. The intersections of these two
curves dene all possible equilibria. In Fig. 2 there is one trivial equilibrium with zero re-
turn and a second equilibrium with positive price return r and equilibrium investment share
x = f(r) = jrjr.
The same analysis can be applied, unmodied, to the investment functions with higher
values of L. The bottom line of these examples and of the previous discussion is that the
agent's memory span L is irrelevant for the question of the existence and location of equilibria:
only the restriction of the investment function f on the \symmetric" plane is relevant and, in
all cases, the equilibria are located on the one dimensional EML and can be presented in a
diagram analogous to Fig. 1.
3.3 Stability Conditions of Equilibria
As the next natural step we move to discuss the stability conditions of the equilibria that has
been identied in the previous Section. We derive the stability conditions from the analysis of
the roots of the characteristic polynomial associated with the Jacobian of system (3.2) com-
puted at equilibrium. The characteristic polynomial does, in general, depend on the behavior
of the individual investment function f in an innitesimal neighborhood of the equilibrium
x. This dependence can be summarized with the help of the following
















where the derivatives of f are computed in point (r;:::;r).
Using the previous denition the equilibrium stability conditions can be formulated in





( e + r)2 : (3.8)












Equilibria Market Line r0
r1
Investment Share
Figure 2: Investment function based on the last two realized returns f(rt 1;rt 2) and its intersection
(thick line) with the plane rt 1 = rt 2. Equilibria are found on this plane as intersections with the
EML (thin line).
The following applies
Proposition 3.2. The xed point x = (x;r;:::;r) of system (3.2) is (locally) asymptoti-











are inside the unit circle.
The equilibrium x is unstable if at least one of the roots of Q() lies outside the unit
circle.
Proof. The condition above is a direct consequence of the characteristic polynomial of the
Jacobian matrix at equilibrium. See appendix B for a derivation.
Once investment function f is known, polynomial P() and, in turn, polynomial Q()
can be explicitly derived. The analysis of the roots of Q() can be used to reveal the role
of the dierent parameters in stabilizing or destabilizing a given equilibrium. For illustrative
purposes we present here the explicit analysis in the simplest case7 in which L = 1.
3.3.1 Example: Na ve forecast.
As an example consider the agent with a memory time span of a single lag, so that his
investment function reads xt+1 = f(rt). In terms of the two-step interpretation of investment
7Results for larger classes of investment functions are presented in Anufriev et al. (2004)
11function discussed in Sec. 2.3, the agent in this example can be thought to have na ve forecast
of the form E[rt+1] = rt.
When L = 1, expression in (3.9) reduces to a second degree polynomial. The multipliers











The following can be derived from well known stability conditions for a two dimensional
system xed point












r >  1 : (3.10)
where f0 = df(r)=dr. This xed point undertakes Neimark-Sacker, fold or 
ip bifurcation if
the rst, the second or the third inequality in (3.10) turns to equality, respectively.
The stability region dened by the inequalities in (3.10) is shown in Fig. 3 in coordinates
r and f0(r)=l0(r). The second coordinate is the relative slope of the investment function
at equilibrium with respect to the slope of the Equilibrium Market Line. Notice that if the
slope of f at the equilibrium increases, the system tends to lose its stability. In particular,
the second inequality in (3.10) requires the slope of investment function to be smaller than
the slope of function l(r).
As an example let us look at the equilibria in Fig. 1. Concerning the nonlinear function,
one can immediately see that equilibrium U1 is unstable since the slope of the function is higher
than the slope of the EML. On the contrary, the slope of the investment function in S1 is very
small, so that, presumably, this equilibrium is stable. For the linear function, equilibrium U2
is clearly unstable while S2 can result stable. As can be seen from Fig. 3, if the slope of the
rst function in S1 increased, this equilibrium would lose stability through a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation. The increase of the slope of the second function in S2 would instead lead to a 
ip
bifurcation.
4 Economy with Many Agents
This Section extends the previous results to the case of a nite, but arbitrarily large, number
of heterogenous agents. Each agent n possesses his own investment function fn based on a
nite number Ln of past market realizations. Without loss of generality, however, we can
assume that the memory spans of the dierent function fn are all the same and equal to the
largest span L = maxfL1;:::LNg, so that each investment function can be thought as having
exactly L arguments
xt+1;n = fn(rt;rt 1;:::;rt L+1) : (4.1)
This section is organized as the previous one. It starts with the derivation of the 2N +
L   1 dimensional stochastic dynamical system which describes the evolution of the economy
and continues with the identication of all possible equilibria of the associated deterministic
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Figure 3: Stability region (gray) and xed point bifurcations for system (3.2) with L = 1. The
parameter space has coordinates r and f0(r)=l0(r).
4.1 Dynamical System
If there is more than one agent on the market, the evolution of agents wealth is not decoupled
from the system and, consequently, all N equations in (2.8) are relevant for the dynamics. In
this case it is convenient to rewrite the system using the individual share of the total wealth
't;n dened in (2.5). The dynamics of price in terms of these variables is provided by the
following












while the agents' wealth shares evolve accordingly to
't+1;n = 't;n
1 + (rt+1 + et)xt;n






8n 2 f1;:::;Ng : (4.3)
Proof. See appendix C.
The rst-order dynamical system associated with (4.2) and (4.3) with investment functions
xt+1;n = fn(rt;rt 1;:::;rt L) as in (4.1) is dened in terms of the following 2N + L   1
independent variables
xt;n 8n 2 f1;:::;Ng; 't;n 8n 2 f1;:::;N   1g; rt;l 8l 2 f0;:::;L   1g; (4.4)
where rt;l denotes the price return at time t   l. Notice that only N   1 wealth shares are
needed. Indeed, at any time step t, it is
PN
n=1 't;n = 1 so that 't;N = 1  
PN 1
n=1 't;n. The
dynamics of the system is provided by the following
13Lemma 4.2. The 2N + L   1 dynamical system dened by (4.2) and (4.3) in terms of the






















































































yN (1 + exN)   xN

PN 1
n=1 'n xn (1   yn) + (1  
PN 1









1 + xn (R + e)
1 + (R + e)
PN 1







 8n 2 f1;:::;N   1g: (4.7)
Proof. We ordered the equations to obtain three separated blocks: X, W and R. In block
X there are N equations dening the investment choices of agents. Block W contains N   1
equations describing the evolution of the wealth shares. Finally, block R is composed by
L equations which describe the evolution of the return. In the last block equations are in
ascending order with respect to the time lag.
The set X is immediately obtained from the denition of the investment functions (4.1).
The rst equation of block R is (4.2) rewritten in terms of variables (4.4) using (4.6) and
(2.5), while the remaining equations are just the result of a \lag" operation. Notice that (4.6)
reduces to (3.1) in the case of a single agent. Finally, the evolution of wealth shares described
in block W is obtained from (4.3) once the notation introduced in (2.5) is explicitly expanded.
Notice that, due to the presence of function R in the last expression, all functions n depend
on the same set of variables as R.
14The rest of this Section is devoted to the analysis of the deterministic skeleton of (4.5):
we replace the yield realizations fetg by their mean value  e and analyze the equilibria of the
resulting deterministic system.
4.2 Determination of Equilibria
The characterization of xed points of system (4.5) is in many respect similar to the single




N 1;r;:::;r) denotes a xed
point where r is the equilibrium return8 and x
n and '
n stay for the equilibrium value of
the investment function and the equilibrium wealth share of agent n, respectively. Let us
introduce the following
Denition 4.1. Agent n is said to \survive" in x if his equilibrium wealth share is strictly
positive, '
n > 0. Agent n is said to \dominate" agent n0 in x if '
n0='
n = 0. An agent n
who dominates, at equilibrium, any other agent n0 6= n is said to \dominate" the economy.
One can recognize the parallel between our denition above and the framework developed
in DeLong et al. (1991). Indeed, we adopt here the deterministic version of the concepts
of survivance and dominance used in that paper. The following statement characterizes all
possible equilibria of system (4.5).
Proposition 4.1. Let x be a xed point of the deterministic skeleton of system (4.5). Two
mutually exclusive cases are possible:
(i) Single agent survival. In x only one agent survives and, therefore, dominates the
economy. Without loss of generality we can assume this agent to be agent 1 so that for





1 if n = 1
0 if n > 1
: (4.8)










) 8n 2 f1;:::;Ng: (4.10)






 +  e) = r
 (4.11)
end is equal to the equilibrium price return.
(ii) Many agents survival. In x more than one agent survives. Without loss of gener-
ality one can assume that the agents with non-zero wealth shares are the rst k agents





1 if n  k






n = 1 : (4.12)
8Remember that return in equilibrium r cannot be equal to   e as mentioned in Section 3.2.






2 =  = x

k = x1k : (4.13)






1k 8n 2 f1;:::;kg : (4.14)





) 8n 2 fk + 1;:::;Ng : (4.15)






 +  e) = r
 ; 8n 2 f1;:::;kg (4.16)
end is equal to the equilibrium price return.
Proof. From block X one immediately has (4.10) and (4.15). From block W using (4.7) and
the condition r +  e 6= 0 one obtains
'



















n 8n 2 f1;:::;N  1g : (4.17)
Finally, from the rst row of block R it is
r



























N (1   x
N)
: (4.18)
The previous set of equations admits two types of solutions, depending on how many
equilibrium wealth shares are dierent from zero: if one or many.
To derive the rst type of solutions assume (4.8). In this case (4.17) is satised for all
agents. From (4.18) one has x
1 = r=( e + r) which together with (4.10) leads to (4.9).
To derive the second type of solutions assume (4.12). In this case, the second equality of
(4.17) must be satised for any n  k. Since its left-hand side does not depend on n, a x
1k
must exist such that x
1 =  = x
k = x
1k. Substituting x
n = 0 for n > k and x
n = x
1k for
n  k in (4.18) one gets x
1k = r=( e + r). The equilibrium return r is implicitly dened
combining this last relation with (4.15) for n  k.
The equilibrium wealth growth rate of the survivors is immediately obtained from (2.8)
and from (4.10) or (4.15) for the single survivor and the many survivors case, respectively.
Strictly speaking, item (i) of the previous Proposition can be seen as a particular case of
item (ii). Nevertheless, the nature of the two situations is deeply dierent. In the rst case,
when a single agent survives, Proposition 4.1 denes a precise value for each component (x,
' and r) of the equilibrium x, so that a single point is uniquely determined. In the second
case, on the contrary, there is a residual degree of freedom in the denition of the equilib-
rium: while r and investment shares x's are uniquely dened, the only requirement on the
equilibrium wealth shares of the surviving agents is the fulllment of the second equality in
(4.12). Consequently, item (ii) does not dene a single equilibrium point but an equilibria
hyperplane in the parameter space. The particular xed point eventually chosen by the sys-
tem will depend on the initial conditions. In the next Section we will see that the partially
16indeterminate nature of the equilibria in the case of many survivors will have a major eect
also on their stability.
The dierences among the two cases of Proposition 4.1 does not only regard the geometrical
nature of the locus of equilibria. Indeed, while in the rst case no requirements are imposed on
the behavior of the investment function of the dierent agents, in the second type of solutions
all the investment shares x
1;:::;x
k must at the same time be equal to a single value x
1k. The
equilibrium with k > 1 survivors exists only in the particular case in which the k investment
functions f1;:::;fk satisfy this restriction. Consequently, an economy composed by N agents
having generic, so to speak \randomly dened", investment functions, has probability zero
of displaying any equilibrium with multiple survivors. In other terms, the many survivors
equilibria are non-generic.
Both types of multi-agent equilibria derived in Proposition 4.1 are strictly related to \spe-
cial" single-agent equilibria. As in the single agent case, the growth rate of the total wealth
is equal to the equilibrium price return and is determined by the growth rate of those agents
who survive in the equilibrium. Moreover, the determination of the equilibrium return level
r for the multi-agent case in (4.9) or (4.14) is identical to the case where the agent, or one of
the agents, who would survive in the multi-agent equilibrium, is present alone in the market.
An useful consequence of this fact is that the geometrical interpretation of market equilibria
presented in Section 3.2 can be extended to illustrate how equilibria with many agents are
determined. As an example consider Fig. 1 and suppose that the two investment functions
shown there belong to two agents who are simultaneously operating on the market. According
to Proposition 4.1 all possible equilibria can be found as intersections of one of the functions
with the Equilibria Market Line (c.f. (4.9) and (4.14)). In this example there are four possible
equilibria. In two of them (S1 and U1) the rst agent, with non-linear investment function,
survives such that '
1 = 1 (and obviously '
2 = 0). In the other two equilibria (S2 and U2)
is the second agent, with linear investment function, who survives so that, in these points,
'
1 = 0. In each equilibrium, the intersection of the investment function of the surviving
agent with the Equilibria Market Line gives both equilibrium return r and the equilibrium
investment share of the survivor. The equilibrium investment share of the other agent can
be found, accordingly to (4.15), as the intersection of his own investment function with the
vertical line passing through the equilibrium return. Since two investment functions shown
in Fig. 1 do not possess common intersections with the EML, the equilibria with more than
one survivors are impossible. Two examples of investment functions which allow for multiple
survivors equilibria are reported in Fig. 4. The common intersection of dierent investment
functions with the equilibria market line dene the multiple survivors equilibria.
4.3 Stability Conditions of Equilibria
This Section presents two propositions relevant for the stability analysis of the equilibria
dened in Proposition 4.1. The rst Proposition provides the stability region in the parameters
space for the generic case of one single survivor. The non-generic case of many survivors is
addressed in the second Proposition, where the destabilizing eect of the existence of an
entire hyperplane of equilibria is revealed. Since the proofs of these Propositions require quite
cumbersome algebraic manipulations, we provide below only their statements and refer the
reader to Appendix D for the intermediate Lemmas and the nal proofs. The discussion
concerning economic interpretation of these Propositions and analysis of their consequences
for the aggregate behavior of the system are postponed to the next Section.

























































Figure 4: Non-generic situations with 3 agents operating on the market. Left panel: In equilibria
S2 and U1 two agents survive. Right panel: In equilibrium U1 all three agents survive.
Proposition 4.2. Let x be a xed point of (4.5) associated with a single survivor equilibrium.





1 if n = 1
0 if n > 1
:
Denote with Pf1() the (L 1)-dimensional stability polynomial associated with the investment
function of the rst agent f1. With the above hypothesis, point x is (locally) asymptotically
stable if the two following conditions are met:
1) all the roots of polynomial
Q1() = 
L+1  
(1 + r)   1
r l0(r)
Pf1() ; (4.19)
are inside the unit circle.








 +  e

< r
 ; 1 < n  N : (4.20)
The equilibrium x is unstable if at least one of the roots of polynomial in (4.19) is outside
the unit circle or if at least one of the inequalities in (4.20) holds with the opposite (strict)
sign.
Thus, the stability condition for a generic xed point in the multi-agent economies is
twofold. First, comparison between Q1() and polynomial Q() from (3.9) implies that equi-
librium should be "self-consistent", i.e. remain stable even if any non-surviving agent would
be removed from the economy. This is however not enough. A further requirement comes from
the two inequalities in (4.20). In particular, according to the second inequality, the wealth
growth rate of those agents who do not survive in the stable equilibrium should be strictly
less than the wealth growth rate of the survivors r. In those equilibria where r >   e the
surviving agent must be the most aggressive and invest a higher wealth share in the risky




























Figure 5: Four equilibria in the market with two agents. The region where condition (4.20) is
satised is shown gray.
The EML \plot" can be used to obtain a geometrical illustration of the previous Propo-
sition. In Fig. 5 we draw again the two investment functions discussed in Section 3. Let us
now suppose that they are both present on the market at the same time. The region where
the additional condition (4.20) is satised is reported in gray. In Section 4.2 we found four
possible equilibria: S1, S2, U1 and U2. First notice that the dynamics cannot be attracted by
U1 or U2. Since these equilibria were unstable in the respective single-agent cases, they cannot
be stable when both agents are present in the market. Assume that S1 and S2 are stable
equilibria when the rst and second function, respectively, are present alone in the market.
Then, from Proposition 4.2, it follows that S1 is the only stable equilibrium of the system
with two agents. Notice, indeed, that in the abscissa of S1, i.e. for the equilibrium return, the
linear investment function of the non-surviving agent passes below the investment function of
the surviving agent and belongs to the gray area. On the contrary, in the abscissa of S2, the
investment function of the non-surviving agent has greater value and does not belong to the
gray area. Consequently, this equilibrium is unstable.
Let us move now to consider the non-generic case, when k dierent agents survive in the
equilibrium. The following applies
Proposition 4.3. A xed point x of (4.5) belonging to a k   1-dimensional manifold of
k-survivors equilibria dened by (4.12),(4.14) and (4.15) is never hyperbolic.




0;:::;0 | {z }
N
;0;:::;0;1;0;:::;0 | {z }
k 1
; 1;0;:::;0 | {z }
N k
;0;:::;0 | {z }
L

; n 2 fN + 1;:::;N + k   1g
with 1 in the n'th place,  1 in the N + k-th place and 0 elsewhere. These vectors correspond
to a change in the relative wealths of the survivors.
19Let Pfn() be the stability polynomial of investment function fn. The equilibrium x is
stable with respect to perturbation orthogonal to the non-hyperbolic manifold if the two following
conditions are met:
1) all the roots of polynomial
Q1k() = 
L+1  






n Pfn() ; (4.21)
are inside the unit circle.






 +  e) < r
 ; k < n  N : (4.22)
The orthogonal perturbations are unstable if at least one of the roots of polynomial in (4.21)
is outside the unit circle or if at least one of the inequalities in (4.22) holds with the opposite
(strict) sign.
The non-hyperbolic nature of the equilibria with many survivors turns out to be a direct
consequence of their non-unique specications. The motion of the system along the k   1
dimensional subspace consisting of the continuum of equilibria leaves the aggregate properties
of the system invariant so that all these equilibria can be considered equivalent. Proposition 4.3
also provides the stability conditions for perturbations in the hyperplane orthogonal to the non-
hyperbolic manifold formed by equivalent equilibria. The polynomial Q1k() is quite similar
to the corresponding polynomial in Proposition 4.2, except that one has to weight the stability
polynomial of the dierent investment functions Pfk() with the weights corresponding to the
relative wealth of survivors in the equilibrium. At the same time, the constraint on the
investment shares in (4.22) is identical to the one obtained in (4.20). In particular, similar to
the case with one survivor, in those equilibria where r >   e all surviving agents must be more
aggressive than those who do not survive. In those equilibria where r <   e the investment
behaviors of survivors have to be less aggressive than the behavior of any non-surviving trader.
4.4 Market Selection and Asymptotic Dominance
In this Section, using the geometric interpretation based on EML \plot", we try to understand
some relevant implications of Proposition 4.2 about the asymptotic behavior of the model and
its global properties. The following discussion is conned to the generic case of equilibria with
a single surviving trader.
The rst implication concerns the aggregate dynamics of the economy. Let us consider a
stable many-agent equilibrium x. Let us suppose that r is the equilibrium return in x and
that the rst agent is dominating. Then his wealth return is equal to 
1 = r and this is also the
asymptotic growth rate of the total wealth. Then, we can interpret the second requirement of
Proposition 4.2 as saying that, in the dynamical competition, those agent survives who allows
the economy to grow with the highest possible rate. Indeed, if any other agent n 6= 1 survived,
the economy would have grown with a rate x
n (r +  e), which, since x
n < x
1, is lower than

1. To put the same statement in negative terms, the economy will never end up in equilibria
where its growth rate is lower than what it would be if the survivor were substituted by some
other agent. One could call this result an optimal selection principle since it clearly states the
market endogenous selection towards the best aggregate outcome.
20Notice, however, that this selection does not apply to the whole set of equilibria, but only
to the subset formed by equilibria associated with stable xed points in the single agent case
(c.f. (4.21)). For instance, with the investment functions shown in Fig. 5, the dynamics will
never end up in U2, even if this is the equilibrium with the highest possible return. But at
least inside this restricted subset of equilibria that would be stable in the single agent case,
is the selection of market optimal? Does the market choose the equilibrium with the highest
growth rate, among all stable single-agent equilibria? If one looks at Fig. 5, the answer seems
armative. In that case the market prefers the stable equilibrium S2 to the unstable S1.
However, even if this "quasi-optimal" selection may be realized for some particular set of
investment functions (like the ones in Fig. 5 and those considered in Chiarella and He (2001)),
it does not apply in general. A simple counter example is provided by a single investment
function possessing multiple stable equilibria. Consider for instance the nonlinear function in
the left panel of Fig. 6. For this investment function both SL and SH are stable. Now suppose
that an agent possessing this function competes on the market with other agents which are
more risk averse than him and always invest smaller shares of wealth in the risky asset. An
example of more risk averse behavior is provided by the linear investment function in the
same plot. In this situation, the two equilibria of the nonlinear function remain stable and
the riskier agent will ultimately dominate the market. But which equilibria will the market
select? It only depends on the initial condition. There are no guarantee that the market will
and up in SH, the highest return equilibrium. Then, the quasi-optimal selection principle in
the sense of Chiarella and He (2001) is violated.
The existence of multiple equilibria also leads to a second interesting implication of Propo-
sition 4.2, the fact that the dominance of one investment behavior on another is a local property
and, consequently, depends on the initial conditions. Consider again the investment function
in the left panel of Fig. 6 and add a second agent with constant investment function, to obtain
the situation shown in the right panel of Fig. 6. The entry of the new agent changes the
possible equilibria, which become the points S and SH. Notice, however, that in these two
equilibria dierent agents dominate the market. If the market before the entry of the new
agent was in SH, the rst agent still remains the more aggressive, and the entry of the new
agent does not aect his dominant position. On the other hand, if the equilibrium before the
entry was SL, this equilibrium becomes unstable and the system will tend to move away from
it. The ensuing dynamic could ultimately choose the investment function of the new entrant
as the dominant one. This simple example suggests that, at least inside our framework, the
denition of a dominance order relation on the space of trading strategies is impossible.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the analysis presented in Chiarella and He (2001) and introduces novel
results concerning the characterization and stability of equilibria in speculative pure exchange
economies with heterogeneous traders.
Let us shortly review the assumptions we made and our achievements in order to sketch
the possible future lines of research. We considered a simple analytical framework using
a minimal number of assumptions (2 assets and Walrasian price formation). We modeled
agents as speculative traders and we imposed the constraint that their participation to the
trading activity is described by an individual demand function proportional to their wealth.
Moreover, we assumed that agents form their individual demand decisions on the predictions




















































Figure 6: Left Panel: Non-linear investment function leading to multiple equilibria. SH and SL are
stable while U is unstable. A second linear investment function always lays below the rst. Right
Panel: The linear investment function is raised above SL. As a result, market now possesses a new
stable equilibria, SM, while SL looses its stability. In the stable equilibria SH and SM two dierent
agents survive.
prescribed but arbitrary specication about the agents' behavior, the feasible dynamics of the
economy (i.e. the dynamics for which prices stay always positive) can then be described as a
multi-dimensional dynamical system.
In such framework we started with a single agent case and presented the xed point sta-
bility analysis of the corresponding system. Then we moved to the general framework with an
arbitrary number of agents and showed that the conditions for the existence of xed points
and the conditions for their stability are related to the corresponding conditions in the sit-
uation with one single agent. We found that dierent scenarios are possible: in the generic
case, the system possesses isolated equilibria where one single trader dominates the others and
ultimately captures the entire market. Alternatively, in the non-generic case in which traders
investment functions satisfy a special set of constraints, the system can possesses a continu-
ous manifold of equilibria associated with non-hyperbolic xed points. In these non-generic
equilibria many agents possess a nite amount of the total wealth of the economy.
The present analysis can be extended in many directions. First of all, even if we proved
that the existence of multiple equilibria is possible, the dynamics in this case remains to
be unveiled. Probably numerical methods can be eectively applied to clarify the role of
initial conditions, the determinants of the relative size of the attraction domains for dierent
equilibria, etc. These methods can be also used to study the dynamics in the cases when there
are no stable equilibria.
Second, one may ask what are the consequences of the optimal selection principle for a
market in which the set of strategies is not "frozen", but instead is evolving in time, plausibly
following some adaptive process. For instance, one can assume that agents imitate the behavior
of other traders (see e.g. Kirman (1991)) or that they update strategies according to recent
relative performances (see e.g. Brock and Hommes (1998)). In such cases, those situations
which we referred as \non-generic" above may become, instead, typical. Proposition 4.3 can
be considered only a rst step in the analysis of such situations.
Third, inside our general framework, numerous dierent specications of the traders strate-
gies are possible, in addition to the ones analyzed here. They range from the evaluation of the
\fundamental" value of the asset, possibly obtained from a private source of information, to a
22strategic behavior that try to keep in consideration the reaction of other market participants
to the revealed individual choices. The analysis of the consequences of the introduction of
such strategies on the optimal selection principle may, ultimately, refute the statement about
the impossibility of dening a dominance relation among strategies.
APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 2.1
Plugging the expression for wt;n from the second equation in (2.4) into the right hand-side of the rst
equation, assuming pt 1 > 0 and, consistently with (2.6), pt 1 6=
P
















xt;n wt 1;n + (et 1   1)
P































where the second equality comes from the rst equation in (2.4) rewritten for time t   1. Condition
(2.6) is immediately obtained imposing pt > 0. Then the price return and wealth return for each
agent n at time t can be derived straightforwardly.
B Proof of Proposition 3.2












































@r2 ::: Rf @f
@rL 2 Rf @f
@rL 1
0 1 0 0 ::: 0 0








0 0 0 0 ::: 0 0










































x (1   x)
: (B.2)
The stability condition of equilibrium are provided by the following









where Pf() denotes the stability polynomial of function f introduced in (3.7).
Proof. Consider (B.1) and introduce (L+1)(L+1) identity matrix I. Expanding the determinant











L 1 + Rf @f
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which, using relations in (B.2) and denition of stability polynomial in (3.7) reduces to (B.3).
Using the relationship l0(r) = x(1   x)=r it is immediate to see that, apart from irrelevant
sign, (B.3) is identical to (3.9).
C Proof of Lemma 4.1
The expression for rt+1 in (4.2) is identical to the one given in (2.7). From (2.8) it is
wt+1;n = wt;n (1 + xt;n (rt+1 + et)) ;




(1 + xt;n (rt+1 + et)) =
=
wt;n P
m wt;m + (rt+1 + et)
P
m xt;mwt;m
(1 + xt;n (rt+1 + et)) =
=
't;n
1 + (rt+1 + et)
P
m xt;m't;m
(1 + xt;n (rt+1 + et)) :
D Proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
Before proving Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 we need some preliminary results. The Jacobian matrix of








matrix. Using the block















































The block @X=@X is a N  N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents' present
investment choices with respect to the agents' past investment choices. According to (2.9) the
24investment choice of any agent does not explicitly depend on the investment choices in previous









= 0 ; 1  n;m  N
and this block is a zero matrix.
The block @X=@W is a N  (N   1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents'










= 0 ; 1  n  N ; 1  m  N   1 :
The block @X=@R is a N  L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents' investment











n ; 1  n  N ; 1  l  L
The block @W=@X is (N  1)N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents' wealth











n  Rxm ; 1  n  N   1 ; 1  m  N (D.2)
where Rxm = @R=@xm, xm
n = @n=@xm and R
n = @n=@R.
The block @W=@W is a (N  1)(N  1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents'











n  R'm ; 1  n;m  N   1 ; (D.3)
where 
'm
n = @n=@'m, R'm = @R=@'m.
The block @W=@R is a (N  1)L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the agents' wealth















m ; 1  n  N   1 ; 1  l  L ; (D.4)
where Rfn = @R=@yn.
The block @R=@X is the L  N matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns
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The block @R=@W is the L  (N   1) matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged




















R'1 R'2 ::: R'N 1





















25The block @R=@R is the L  L matrix containing the partial derivatives of the lagged returns























Rr0 Rr1 ::: RrL 1
1 0 ::: 0






























Lemma D.1. Let x be an equilibrium of system (4.5). The Jacobian matrix computed in this point


























































































































k 0 ::: 0 0
0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0 
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0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 
'N 1
N 1 0 ::: 0 0
Rx1 ::: Rxk 0 ::: 0 0 ::: 0 R'k+1 ::: R'N 1 Rr0 ::: RrL 2 RrL 1











































































1 + r ;
xm
n = '
n (n;m   '
m)
 e + r









n(r +  e)

  '






where n;l 2 f1;:::;N   1g, m 2 f1;:::;Ng and '
N = 1  
PN 1
j=1 '
j. Then from (4.12) and (4.13)
it follows that R



























= 0 ; 8n;m :





1k (1   x
1k)
; R'm = x





1k (1   x
1k)
; (D.7)
so that Rxm = 0 for m > k and R'm = 0 for m  k. The structure above immediately follows.
Lemma D.2. The characteristic polynomial PJ of the matrix J(x) can be reduced to the following
form





j (r +  e)














where Pfn is the stability polynomial associated to the n-th investment function as dened in (3.7).
Proof. The following proof is constructive: we will identify in succession the factors appearing in
(D.8). At each step, a set of eigenvalues is found and the problem is reduced to the analysis of the
residual matrix obtained removing the rows and columns associated with the relative eigenspace. In
this way the dimension of the analyzed matrix is progressively reduced.
Consider the Jacobian matrix in Lemma D.1. The last N   k columns of the left blocks contain
only zero entries so that the matrix possesses eigenvalue 0 with (at least) multiplicity N k. Moreover,
in each of the last N  1 k rows in the central blocks the only non-zero entries are on the diagonal.
Consequently, 
'j
j for k + 1  j  N   1 are eigenvalues of the matrix, with multiplicity (at least)











j(r +  e)
1 + r   

(D.9)
where we used (D.6) to compute 
'j
j at equilibrium.
In order to nd the remaining part of the characteristic polynomial we eliminate the rows and
























































































k 0 ::: 0 0
Rx1 ::: Rxk 0 ::: 0 Rr0 ::: RrL 2 RrL 1

















































Consider the \central" block: since it has only zeros above and below, it is a \diagonal" block and
its eigenvalues are at the same time eigenvalues of the whole matrix. To compute these eigenvalues,





n v if n  k and n = m
'
n v if n;m  k and n 6= m





  e + r
1 + r :
27so that the central block can be rewritten as
kI1 + v' ::: Ik + v'k
where Ij is the j-th column vector of the k k identity matrix, and ' = ('
1;:::;'
k)t is the column
vector of equilibrium market shares. Using the multilinear property of the determinant one has
j(1   )I1 + v' ::: (1   )Ik + v'j =
(1   )k jI1 ::: Ikj + (1   )k 1 v
k X
j=1
jI1 ::: Ij 1 ' Ij+1 ::: Ikj
where zero determinant terms containing more than one ' column has been discarded. The rst
contribution on the right hand side is the identity matrix, while the matrices in the summation are





j = (1 )k 1(1 +v) = (1 )k 1

1 + x
N(r +  e)
1 + r   

: (D.11)
Having identied the eigenstructure of the central block we can eliminate it so that the nal factor of
the characteristic polynomial can be found from the computation of the determinant of the matrix































Rx1 ::: Rxk Rr0    ::: RrL 2 RrL 1


















We compute this determinant in a recursive way. Consider the expansion by the determinant of the
minors of the elements of the rst column. The minor of the rst element   is a matrix with a
structure similar to M(k;L 1). This is the nal matrix obtained if the rst agents were not among
the survivors. Let us denote its determinant with M(k   1;L   1). The minor associated with Rx1
has a left upper block with k  1 entries equal to   below the main diagonal. This block generates
a contribution k 1 to the determinant and once its columns and rows are eliminated, one remains
with a matrix of the type in (E.1). Applying Lemma E.1 one then has
M(k;L   1) = ( )M(k   1;L   1) + ( 1)kRx1k 1 ( 1)L 1 Pf1() ;
where Pf1 is the stability polynomial associated with the rst investment function. Applying recur-
sively the relation above, the dimension of the determinant is progressively reduced. At the end one
remains with the lower right block of the original matrix, which is again a matrix similar to (E.1).

















1k (1   x
1k)
;
28we can simplify the last expression and get
( 1)L 1+k k 1
0







j Pfj()   L+1
1
A : (D.12)
Finally, the product of (D.9), (D.11) and (D.12) gives (D.8).
Using the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix it is straightforward to derive the
equilibrium stability conditions mentioned in Section 4.3.
Case of one survivor: Proof of Proposition 4.2
If k = 1 the characteristic polynomial (D.8) reduces to




j (r +  e)
1 + r   
 
L+1  







>From the expression of the derivative of the EML at equilibrium l0(r) one can see that last factor









 < 1 j > 1 ;
and the Proposition is proved.
Case of many survivors: Proof of Proposition 4.3
In the case of k > 1 survivors the characteristic polynomial in (D.8) possesses a unit root with
multiplicity k   1. Consequently, the xed point is non-hyperbolic. The eigenspace associated to
eigenvector 1 is a subspace of the central block in (D.10). One can see by direct computation that
the k  1 linearly independent vectors un dened in the Proposition form a base of this space. Since
this space does not depend on system parameters, it is immediate to realize that it does constitute
not only the tangent space to the non-hyperbolic manifold, but the manifold itself. The polynomial









  < 1 j > k + 1 :
E Determinant of auxiliary matrix










x1 x2 x3 ::: xn 1 xn
1   0 ::: 0 0
0 1   ::: 0 0







0 0 0 :::   0












xk n k ; (E.1)
29Proof. Consider this determinant as a sum of elements from the rst row multiplied on the cor-
responding minor. The minor of element xk is a block-diagonal matrix consisting of two blocks.
The upper-left block is an upper-diagonal matrix with 1's on the diagonal. The lower-right block
is a lower-diagonal matrix with  's on the diagonal. The determinant of this minor is equal to
( )n 1 k and the relation above immediately follows.
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